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The absurdities of Moore’s paradoxes* 
by 
JOHN N .  WILLIAMS 
(Hull University) 
I 
1 ARGUED ELSEWHERE that ‘Moore’s Paradox’ is in fact one 
of two different paradoxes. ([14]). 
(i) ‘p&-Ibp” e.g. ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t 
believe that I did’ (see [9], p. 543) 
or that of saying 
(ii) ‘p&Ib-p’ e.g. ‘I believe that he has gone out but has not’ (see 
[lo], p. 204). 
The absurdity of (i) and (ii) arises because asserting ‘p’ normally 
expresses a belief that p .  Normally, when (i) is asserted, what is 
conjointly expressed and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a lack of 
belief that p ,  is logically impossible, whereas normally, when (ii) is 
asserted, it is differently absurd, since what is conjointly expressed 
and asserted, i.e. a belief that p and a belief that -p ,  is logically 
possible, but inconsistent. 
A possible source of confusion between ‘impossible’ and ‘incon- 
sistent’ is the fact that a proposition which is inconsistent tout court 
is always self-contradictory and hence necessarily false, unlike one 
which is inconsistent with other propositions. 
Whereas the proposition Ibp&-Ibp is inconsistent, the proposi- 
tion IBp&IB-p is not. I cannot hold a belief which I lack, but I can 
The paradox is either that of saying 
* I am grateful to Bengt Hansson and Peter Gardenfors for their criticisms of an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
I shall use the notation ‘Jbp’ for ’I believe thatp’, ‘-lbp’ for ’It is not the case that 
I believe that p’, ‘AbAb-p’ for ‘A believes that A believes that it is not the case that 
p ’ ,  ‘ A k p ~ A b p ’  for ’If A knows that p then A believes that p’  and so on. 
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hold inconsistent beliefs. And while the proposition Zbp&Zb-p is 
itself consistent, its truth betrays the inconsistency of my beliefs, i.e. 
that they cannot all be correct, since the proposition p&-p is 
inconsistent. 
Making an absurd assertion always betrays some irrationality. 
Often this comes from the perspicuous inconsistency or self-contra- 
dictoriness of the assertion itself. Yet it may have another source. 
Indeed, as is generally recognised, the absurdity of ‘Moore’s Para- 
dox’ cannot arise from the self-contradictoriness of what is asserted, 
for the non-existence of correct beliefs is as much a logical possibil- 
ity as the existence of incorrect ones. Hence, the puzzle of asser- 
tions such as (i) or (ii) is how the asserting party can demonstrate 
irrationality by asserting a possible truth. 
I shall now show how failing to distinguish (i) and (ii) vitiates past 
analyses of ‘the paradox’. I shall then outline further differences 
between the two paradoxes and will show that my analysis explains 
both the absurdities and the difference in absurdity, in various 
contexts of utterance. 
I1 
Moore’s own solution to ‘the paradox’ explains the absurdity of (ii) 
only by failing to explain that of (i). He maintains that ‘I believe he 
has gone out but he has not’ is ‘absurd, because by saying “he has 
not gone out7’ we imply that we do not believe that he has gone 
out’([lO]), p. 204). Moore’s solution is that by saying ‘p’ I imply that 
-Zb-p. Hence by saying (ii) I conjointly imply and say that Zb-p & 
-Zb-p, which is logically impossible. 
But this fails for (i). If by saying ‘p’ I imply that -Zb-p then in 
saying (i), I conjointly imply and say that -Zbp & -Zb-p, which is 
neither logically impossible nor inconsistent. One might hold no 
beliefs either way about whether p and moreover cogently express 
one’s total lack of opinion. 
Wolgast commented recently that 
. . . truth is related to belief . . . And the issue of the “truth” of Moore’s 
sentence cannot arise, because that sentence cannot express a belief. It is 
self-vitiating. ([16], p. 119) 
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The relation alluded to is that the truth of p entails the correctness 
of a belief that p .  Indeed she says 
To ask whether something is true is to raise the question whether such a 
belief would be true. ([16], p. 110) 
But not only is it both possibly true that p & -Ibp and possibly true 
that p & Ib-p,  but moreover a belief of either may be correct 
unless I myself believe the former. In this case, since it follows that 
Ibp & Ib - Ibp,  my belief that -Ibp is incorrect. 
Wolgast’s reason for contending that I cannot express a belief 
that (i) or (ii) seems the same as Black’s reason for contending that 
I cannot assert (i), namely that in no circumstances could one 
understand what the speaker was trying to say. ( [ 3 ] ,  p. 29). Willis 
suggests likewise in alleging that the utterance ‘Mushrooms are 
poisonous but I don’t believe it’, ‘would in all circumstances be 
pointless, even though it might be true or false’ ([15], p. 25). 
Three objections defeat this view. 
First, one may make an assertion in a manner such that knowl- 
edge is claimed rather than merely expressing belief. In such cir- 
cumstances, asserting (ii) is absurd, yet not pointless. One can 
understand why a patient asserts ‘People aren’t persecuting me but I 
can’t help believing they are’, i.e. to reassure his psychiatrist that he 
is aufuit  both with the world and his delusive belief. Yet his remark 
is absurd for he inconsistently asserts a belief of the contradictory of 
what he claims to know. 
Second, since the absurdity of (i) or (ii) arises from a clash 
between what is asserted and what is done by asserting, it is 
mistaken to identify the absurdity either with what is asserted or, 
like those above, with the making of the assertion. Wolgast’s as- 
sumption that the identification must be made, is typical: 
. . . we want to say it must be meaningful because it might be true, and on 
the other hand we want to say it is not only ‘absurd’ but meaningless ([16], 
P. 92) 
The tension in this thought arises from failing to distinguish assert- 
ing something from what is thereby asserted. What one asserts in 
asserting (i) or (ii) is intelligible but this should not be confused with 
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the fact that in both cases one normally could understand neither 
why it was asserted, nor the asserting party. 
Third, even when asserting (i) or (ii) is absurd, it follows neither 
that one does not assert it, nor that one does not express a belief of 
it. Reasons for either view to the contrary might be the alleged 
impossiblity of making contradictory assertions or of expressing 
contradictory beliefs. But these latter theses are only relevant to (i), 
since the absurdity of asserting (ii) is unrelated to anything conjoint- 
ly self-contradictory. Even were these theses correct it follows 
neither that one cannot assert (i)’ nor that one cannot express a 
belief of it, for what is in contradiction when absurdity arises is 
neither assertion with assertion, nor expression with expression, but 
rather assertion with expression. 
Hintikka’s explanation is different: 
. . . the gist of Moore’s paradox may be said . . . to lie in the fact that {(i)} is 
necessarily unbelievable by the speaker. ([8]. p. 67) 
Hintikka argues that (i) is ‘defensible’, i.e. not self-contradictory, 
whereas ‘I believe that the case is as follows: p but I do not believe 
that p’ is ‘indefensible’ i.e. self-contradictory. His reason for think- 
ing this is the view that A b p I A b A b p ,  for of A b p  & -AbAbp he 
says 
. . . in the case of an individual a failure of this kind may be taken as 
impossible. ([8], p. 29) 
But it does not follow that it is impossible that Ib(p & -Ibp). For if 
I believe all of this then Zbp & Ib-Zbp. On Hintikka’s view this 
becomes a case in which IbIbp & 16-Ibp, which is merely a 
sophisticated case of inconsistent beliefs, and hence is possible. 
Nor will Hintikka’s view that A b p x A b A b p  support the same 
explanation of the absurdity of (ii), i.e. that it is impossible that 
Zb(p & Zb-p). For it follows that Ibp & IbZb-p. On Hintikka’s 
view this becomes a case in which IbIbp & ZbIb-p, which again is 
possible. One may become convinced of contradiction in one’s 
beliefs, e.g. when they are sincerely held premises, whether this 
conviction constitutes recognition or merely neurotic misjudge- 
ment. 
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Hintikka could stipulate that AbpI-Ab-Abp independently of 
the view that Abp2AbAbp.  But this new stipulation would not 
entail the impossibility of my believing (ii). For, because AbAb-ph 
Ab-Abp, it may be the case that IbIb-p and yet not be the case 
that Zb -Zbp . 
Moreover, there seems no reason to accept that AbpIAbAbp.  It 
is surely possible that Abp & -AbAbp (see [4]) just as it is possible 
that Abp & Ab-Abp or even that Abp & AbAb-p. All these are 
possibilities which may be realised separately yet which may well 
occur together, as when one’s belief is a prejudice of which one is 
unaware. One who evinces his belief that Asians are untrustworthy, 
namely by distrusting them, but who sincerely professes openmind- 
edness might not believe he believes this, believe he doesn’t, or 
even believe that he believes that Asians are trustworthy. 
Deutscher’s analyses fail to differentiate the absurdities in (i) and 
(ii). His original analysis is that: 
What is wrong with ‘p but I believe that not p’ is this. If the speaker is 
correct then what he says is false. That is to say, only if what he says is false 
may he be correct. ([5], p. 54) 
By ‘is correct’ Deutscher means ‘correctly believes’. This accurate 
insight cannot explain the absurdity in (i). When I assert ‘p & -Ibp’ 
I may have no beliefs regarding whether p and hence I may assert 
something true. For I may assert this in a manner or context such 
that it claims knowledge, without expressing belief, of (i). I shall 
argue that neither does knowing that p entail believing that p nor 
does a claim to know that p entail expressing a belief that p .  But in 
such a case, since the correctness of my beliefs is irrelevant, it is 
mistaken to describe me as an incorrect believer. 
Deutscher’s modified analysis that 
. . . if the speaker believes all that he says when he utters ‘p but I don’t 
believe that p’, then it is logically impossible for him to hold any correct 
beliefs. ([6], p. 184) 
is equally true of one who utters (ii) but fails to account for the 
different absurdities in (i) and (ii). For unlike (i), I can correctly 
believe (ii). 
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If I believe (i) then Zbp. But since my belief of (i) is correct, then 
p & -Ibp. Hence my belief that -Ibp and afortiori my belief of (i), 
is incorrect. 
Alternatively, I can correctly believe (ii) although it’s correctness 
would entail further incorrect beliefs. If I correctly believe (ii) then 
p & Ib-p. As Deutscher rightly shows, (161, p. 184), if -Ab-p 
then A’s belief that A b - p  is incorrect, But if, as is possible, Zbp & 
Ib-p (admittedly entailing an incorrect belief) my belief of (ii) is 
correct. 
I11 
Analysing (i) and (ii) in terms of conflict between what is asserted 
and what is done by asserting (i.e. expressing a belief of it) explains 
why both (i) and (ii) are absurd and points to a difference in 
absurdity. 
Further differences surface when (i) or (ii) is asserted in a way 
such as to claim knowledge of it. 
When one asserts (i) like this, e.g. stridently, this assertion 
becomes sensible, whereas when one asserts (ii) like this, the absur- 
dity remains, for what is conjointly claimed and asserted, i.e. 
knowledge that p and belief that -p, is inconsistent (regarding this 
see [7]). 
Consider the woman, shocked by reliable accounts of her hus- 
band’s death, who says ‘He’s dead - I don’t believe it!’. In these 
circumstances saying this seems entirely sensible. This is because by 
asserting it like this she voices a claim to know it. These circum- 
stances differ e.g. from those in which the assertion serves to 
repudiate the veracity of a mere clue of the death. In these latter 
circumstances one could record the widow’s words as ‘He is dead? -I 
don’t believe it’ i.e. expressing scepticism, rather than ‘He is dead- I 
don’t believe it’ i.e. expressing shock and lack of belief in response to 
the recognised facts. Moreover it is implausible to re-interpret her 
assertion as expressing refusal to be reconciled with the fact of her 
husband’s death, i.e. a refusal to allow the belief that he is dead to 
figure in her practical reasoning, rather than as a claim to know she 
lacks this belief. For knowing she lacks this belief is itself good 
reason for excluding it from her practical reasoning. The widow 
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could quite plausibly arrange a funeral while repeating in horror ‘He 
is dead - I don’t believe it’. Consequently she asserts that he’s dead, 
asserts that she doesn’t believe it, claims to know it and claims to 
know that she doesn’t believe it. The conjunction of all this is both 
logically possible and consistent given, as has been well argued ([2], 
One might object that nonetheless whenever asserting ‘p’ claims 
knowledge that p ,  it also expresses a belief that p .  Granted this, 
then when asserted emphatically so as to claim knowledge, both (i) 
and (ii) would be differently absurd, parallel to their absurdities 
when the assertion merely expresses belief. But granted this one 
must maintain the implausible view that the ‘shocked widow’ cases 
are absurd. 
Again the main reason for making this objection would be that 
AkpxAbp. But even were this correct, it does not follow that a 
claim to know is always an expression of belief. When asserting ’p’ 
claims knowledge that p it is likely to also express a belief that p .  
But this is a psychological, not a logical point. When a fanatical 
sportsman’s wife exclaims ’He’s not at the match - I don’t believe 
it!’ we have no reason to doubt that she has spoken truthfully, in 
which case she lacks a belief that he isn’t at the match. With the fact 
that she asserts this forcefully enough to claim knowledge of it, this 
gives us good reason to suppose that she claims to know without 
expressing a belief of what she claims to know. 
Alternatively it does seem absurd to exclaim ‘He is dead - I 
believe he isn’t!’, (or ’He’s not at the match but I believe he is’). 
This is because asserting (ii) emphatically, claims knowledge of it. 
Hence were I to exclaim this I would conjointly claim and assert 
that I know that he’s dead and that I believe that he isn’t. And 
although this is logically possible it is surely inconsistent. While 
different from the inconsistency of holding contradictory beliefs, it 
is nonetheless inconsistent to believe the contradictory of what one 
knows, for in both cases an incorrect belief must necessarily result 
from one’s own cognition. 
A further difference between (i) and (ii) now emerges. For unlike 
(i), there is no reason to deny that in claiming knowledge of (ii), 
asserting it does not also express belief of it. 
[Ill, ~ 2 1 ,  ~311 ,  A W A ~ ~ .  
THE ABSURDITIES OF MOORE’S PARADOXES 45 
But the absurdity of asserting (ii) thus emphatically is at least 
two-fold, for now one also conjointly expresses and asserts a belief, 
e.g. that he is dead and a belief that he isn’t, which is likewise, but 
differently, inconsistent. 
Finally, my analysis needs further complication. For merely ob- 
serving that one normally expresses a belief that p by asserting ‘p’ 
neglects the status of the assertion ‘Zbp’. 
Admittedly, it seems odd to insist that I do not normally express a 
belief that Ibp in asserting ‘Ibp’ (see [l], p. 5) .  For asserting ‘Zbp’ is 
a sophisticated case of asserting ‘q’, and asserting ‘q’ normally 
expresses a belief that q. But it would be equally mistaken to say 
that one does not normally express a belief that p in asserting ‘Ibp’. 
It would be odd, to say the least, if one could not express a 
belief by asserting that one holds it, as well as by asserting the thing 
believed. 
Seeing this is obscured by the practice of representing A’s asser- 
tion ‘p  & Ib-p’ as A asserting ’p & Ab-p’. The assertion ‘Ab-p, 
even by A himself, is not clearly expressive of a belief that -p held 
by the asserting party, unlike ‘Ib-p’. 
Obviously this is relevant only to the analysis of (ii). For only in 
asserting (ii) does the asserting party assert that he believes. In 
asserting ‘-Zbp’ I normally only express a belief that -Zbp, whereas 
in asserting ‘Zb-p’ I express a belief that Zb-p and express a belief 
that p .  
Consequently, when one asserts (ii) in a way merely expressive of 
one’s belief of it, what one expresses simpliciter is also inconsistent, 
since one expresses both a belief thatp and a belief that - p .  Hence, 
unlike (i), the absurdity in (ii) normally arises from a double source. 
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